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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- ABORTION -STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION-VOID FOR VAGUENESS-The United States Supreme Court has
held that statutory provisions requiring a physician to exercise a high
degree of care to preserve the life of a fetus which "may be viable" are
unconstitutionally vague.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
On September 20, 1974, John Franklin, M.D.,' and the Planned
Parenthood Association' filed a complaint in federal district court
against the District Attorney of Philadelphia8 and the Secretary of
Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.' In the complaint, plain-
tiffs challenged the constitutionality5 of the Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act (the Act), and sought a declaration' that the statute was
1. Dr. Franklin is a Board-certified obstetrician-gynecologist practicing in Penn-
sylvania. As a director of Planned Parenthood, he supervised the operation of a clinic, in-
cluding such family planning services as birth control, pregnancy testing, counseling and
referral. While serving as a medical director of Philadelphia Family Planning, Inc., Dr.
Franklin performed approximately 10 to 12 abortions per week during 1971 and 1972. In
1974, he performed 21 abortions prior to November 20th. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
2. Planned Parenthood Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania, Inc., is a volun-
tary, non-profit health and social service agency incorporated by the state of Penn-
sylvania. Presently, Planned Parenthood performs no abortions at its facilities, but plans
to build and operate an abortion clinic in the future. Id. at 559-60.
3. F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Jr., District Attorney of Philadelphia County, was sued in
his official capacity since he was responsible for enforcement of the Abortion Control Act
in Philadelphia. Id. at 560.
4. When the action was commenced, Helene Wohlgemuth was Secretary of Welfare
of Pennsylvania. During the course of the litigation, she was replaced by Frank S. Beal
who was subsequently replaced by Aldo Colautti, one of the designated appellants. Colautti
v. Franklin 439 U.S. 379, 383 n.3 (1979); Brief for Appellants at 4 n.2.
5. 439 U.S. at 383. The plaintiffs alleged that enforcement of the Act would abridge
their constitutionally protected rights to practice medicine consistent with professional
standards; intrude into the physician-patient relationship in the decision making and treat-
ment of pregnancy; and interfere with the rights of their patients to terminate their
pregnancies under the conditions set forth in the Supreme Court decisions of Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Id.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6601-6608 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1979). The Act was
passed over the veto of Governor Milton Shapp on September 10, 1974, to be effective in
thirty days. Id. § 6601; 439 U.S. at 381. It should be noted that the complaint was filed
prior to the effective date. 439 U.S. at 383.
7. The relief was sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) which authorizes civil
actions at law, in equity, or other proper proceedings to redress deprivation under color
of state law of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 559.
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invalid in its entirety.' A three judge panel,' after hearing oral argu-
ment on the plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction, enjoined
enforcement of numerous provisions of the Act." The court also
granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the case as a class action."
After a full hearing on the merits, the court declared that various sec-
tions of the Act, as well as the related criminal sanctions" were un-
constitutional." Section 5(a),' which required physicians to exercise a
8. Despite the existence of a severability clause in § 9 of the Act, the plaintiffs
claimed that the entire statute should be invalidated because the legislature's intent to
unconstitutionally limit, deter, and regulate abortion was evident in the title and
throughout the language and provisions of the Act. Id. at 564.
9. The three judge panel was convened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970).
Although repealed by the Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, the
repeal did not apply to the instant action. 439 U.S. at 381, n.2.
10. • 401 F. Supp. at 559. The Commonwealth was temporarily enjoined from enforcing
§ 2 (definition of "viable" and "informed consent"); § 3(b)(i) (spousal consent requirement);
§ 3(b)(ii) (parental consent requirement for minors); § 3(e) (criminal sanctions for violation
of consent provisions); § 5(a) (standard of care required of physicians determining
viability); § 5(d) (criminal penalties for violation of § 5(a)); § 6(b) (prohibition of post-
viability abortions unless necessary to preserve maternal life or health); § 6(c) (licensing
requirements); § 6(d) (record-keeping requirements); § 6(i) (criminal penalties for violation
of § 6(a)-(e), (g)-(h)); and § 7 (prohibiting state subsidy of abortion). Id.
11. 401 F. Supp. at 559. The class was composed of all physicians who either performed
abortions, or who might be called upon to counsel patients contemplating abortions. The
district court then granted leave for the Obstetrical Society of Philadelphia to intervene
as a party plaintiff and for the Attorney General of Pennsylvania and the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania to intervene as parties defendant. Id Robert P. Kane, then Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, was sued in his official capacity as legal advisor to the Governor
and as chief law enforcement officer of the Commonwealth. Id at 561. At a later date the
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case as to the referral agencies, based
on Article III of the United States Constitution which limits federal court jurisdiction to
"cases and controversies." The court stated that no justiciable controversy was presented
by the referral agencies since there was no evidence that they might be prosecuted as
counsel-conspirators or accessories under the Act. Id. at 562.
12. IM at 583. The court enjoined the enforcement of §§ 2, 3(b)(ii), 6(b), 6(d) (in part),
6(f), and 7. See note 10 supra
13. 401 F. Supp. at 561.
14. This section provides:
Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior thereto have
made a determination based on his experience, judgment or professional com-
petence that the fetus is not viable . . . or if there is sufficient reason to believe
that the fetus may be viable, shall exercise that degree of professional skill, care
and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would
be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended
to be born and not aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be that
which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive so long
as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or
health of the mother.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977).
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high degree of care to preserve the life of a fetus which "may be
viable," was among those sections declared to be unconstitutional. In
light of Roe v. Wade,"6 the district court interpreted the language of
section 5(a) as carving out a third new time period concerning fetal life
which extended into the second trimester during which the state was
attempting to regulate abortions.16 Although Roe had indicated that sec-
ond trimester abortions may be regulated in the interest of maternal
health,'7 no such claim was applicable to this case. Thus, the district
court found that the regulations were an attempt to protect fetal life
during the "may be viable" period, and as such were unlawful. 8 Both
parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court"9 which vacated
that portion of the judgment which was the subject of the defendants'
appeal' and remanded the case for consideration in light of recent
Court decisions." On remand, the parties resolved all issues by stipula-
tion except the constitutionality of section 5(a) and section 7 of the
Act.' The district court adhered to its original decision that section
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe established that women have a fundamental right to have
an abortion provided that the fetus is not viable. This right is based upon the right to
privacy embodied in the various constitutional amendments. Id. at 152-53. In Roe, the
Supreme Court recognized only two periods concerning fetuses: the period prior to viability
when the state may not regulate abortion in the interest of fetal life, and the period after
viability when the state may regulate or prohibit abortions as it sees fit. Id at 163.
16. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. at 552. See also note 15
supra.
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
18. 401 F. Supp. at 572.
19. The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1253 (1976) which provides for direct appeals from decisions of three-judge courts. 439
U.S. at 381.
20. Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
21. Id. The Court remanded the defendant's appeal to the district court for further
consideration in light of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (upheld state
statute defining viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn
child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-
supportive systems"); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (physicians have standing to
maintain a federal action challenging their licensing state's denial of Medicaid funds for
abortions which are not medically indicated provided they show sufficient interest in the
outcome of the challenge); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (recipients of advertisements for prescription drugs enjoy first
amendment protection of that information). Based on these decisions, the Court disposed
of plaintiffs' appeal by summarily affirming the lower court's judgment. Franklin v. Fitz-
patrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
22. 439 U.S. at 385-86. Section 7 of the Act prohibited the use of public funds for an
abortion that was not certified by a physician to be medically necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother. It was not challenged by plaintiffs on final appeal. Id at 383,
386.
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5(a) was unconstitutional, in part because the definition of "viable" in-
corporated into section 5(a) was void for vagueness, and in part
because the phrase "may be viable" was overbroad in its potential
scope. 8 The defendants again appealed to the United States Supreme
Court24 which affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that the portion of
section 5(a) of the Act which required a physician to observe a
prescribed standard of care if that physician determined "that the
fetus is viable or if there is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus
may be viable"" contained two ambiguities which made that portion of
the statute unconstitutionally vague.' First, the Court noted the inabil-
ity to determine whether the statute fixed a totally subjective stan-
dard for physicians, or whether the standard was both objective and
subjective. 8 Justice Blackmun read the statute as creating two condi-
tions which could trigger the duty of care. He stated that the first con-
dition, which required a physician to determine if the fetus "is viable,"
imposed a subjective standard based upon the individual physician's
"experience, judgment, or professional competence."' However, the se-
cond condition, which required the physician to determine "if there is
sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable," created an
ambiguous standard. Justice Blackmun reasoned that it was unclear
under the standard whether "sufficient reason" would be judged
in light of the physician's own experience and capabilities, or whether
"sufficient reason" would be judged by the standards of the whole
medical community, or by experts in the field."
Appellants urged that no distinction was intended between the
phrase "is viable" and the phrase "may be viable," and that the latter
23. Id. at 386.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976) confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to review by
direct appeal an order of a statutorily mandated three-judge court restraining state of-
ficials from enforcing a state statute.
25. 439 U.S. 379. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined the
majority opinion. Id at 380.
26. See note 14 supra for text of § 5(a).
27. 439 U.S. at 390. Because the Court found the statute void for vagueness, it was
unnecessary to consider the argument that the challenged section restricted abortions
prior to the point of viability and was, therefore, overbroad. See also Brief for Appellants
at 11.
28. 439 U.S. at 391.
29. Id
30. Id at 391-92. The Court stated that this ambiguity could be a serious hazard for
the typical private practitioner without access to the skills and facilities available to other
physicians at large medical centers and teaching hospitals. Id.
Vol. 18:161
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phrase was merely an explanation of the former phrase." The majority
rejected this contention and noted that because the phrases were not
synonymous a second ambiguity existed in that "may be viable" might
refer to viability as physicians understood it, and "viable" might refer
to some later undetermined stage in the pregnancy.82 Further, Justice
Blackmun reasoned that if the phrases were intended to be
synonymous, the inclusion of both was redundant and contrary to
elementary canons of statutory construction." Since "may be viable"
was used in no other section of the statute to define "viable," the
Court concluded that the definition of "viable" in section 2 of the Act"
was the exclusive definition' to be used throughout the Act.
Therefore, the incorporation of the phrase "may be viable" into section
5(a) referred to a separate stage of pregnancy." Justice Blackmun held
that this reference to an indeterminable phase of the pregnancy dif-
fered from the definition of viability put forth by the Court in Roe v.
Wade.87 The Colautti Court also utilized the Roe Court's conclusion
that the state has a compelling interest in the protection of fetal life
only if the fetus is viable.u Thus, it was unnecessary to determine
what stages were referred to by the phrases "viable" and may be
viable," or whether one of them actually extended into the "gray"
31. Id. The appellants argued that "may be viable" described the statistical probability
of viability rather than actual viability. Therefore, the statutory phrase "may be viable"
incorporated the medical knowledge that a fetus is viable if it has the statistical chance of
survival recognized by the medical profession. The appellants relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See Brief for Ap-
pellants at 28. In Planned Parenthood, the Supreme Court defined viability as "the stage
of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely out-
side the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." 428 U.S. at 52 (emphasis
added).
32. 439 U.S. at 393.
33. Id. One of the elementary canons of statutory construction is that all parts of a
statute should be given meaning if possible. It is the Court's duty "to give effect, if possi-
ble, to every clause and word in a statute," rather than to emasculate an entire section.
United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955); accord, Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
U.S. 147, 152 (1883).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6602 (Purdon 1977), defined viability as "the capability of
a fetus to live outside the mother's womb albeit with artificial aid."
35. 439 U.S. at 392. The Court noted that the statute says viable "means," not "in-
cludes," the capability for fetal survival outside the womb. Id. at 392-93 n.10. A definition
which declares what a. term "means" generally excludes any meaning not stated. 2A C.
SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 47.07 (Supp. 1978).
36. 439 U.S. at 392-93.
37. Id. at 393. The definition approved in Roe is that a fetus becomes "viable" when
it is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 160.
38. See note 15 supra for a brief discussion of Roe v. Wade.
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penumbral area prior to the time of viability." The mere presence of
such ambiguous criteria was sufficient reason to void the section for
vagueness."
According to the majority, the physician's dilemma was compounded
by potential criminal penalties under the Act which could be imposed
even if the physician lacked scienter in failing to preserve the life of a
fetus which "may be viable."'1 Although the Pennsylvania law of
criminal homicide'2 conditions guilt upon a showing of scienter, no
equivalent showing of scienter was required when a physician failed to
find "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable."
Justice Blackmun stated that the difficulties inherent to a viability
determination,'3 when coupled with strict liability for an erroneous
determination, would "chill" the willingness of physicians to perform
abortions at a point of near viability."
The Court then examined the "standard of care" provision of section
5(a),' 5 which required the physician to choose the abortion technique
with the best chance of saving the fetus, provided a different tech-
nique was not necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."
Blackmun could not determine if the statute permitted the physician to
view the duty to the patient as being the same as the duty to the
39. 439 U.S. at 388-89, 391, 393.
40. Id at 390.
41. Id at 394.
42. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2501-2504 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1979).
43. 439 U.S. at 395-96. See Brief for Appellants at 6-8 and Brief for Appellees at 5-6
for a summary of the testimony given by various medical experts on the determination of
viability. Estimates of the gestation age at which viability occurs ranged from a possible
21 weeks gestation age that a neonatologist might consider viable to a 50% to 60%
chance of survival at 28 weeks gestation age. Witnesses on both sides acknowledged a
three to four week margin of error in computing gestation age.
44. 439 U.S. at 396. The Court refrained from deciding whether scienter was required
before criminal penalties could be imposed under a statute clearly drafted. Id.
45. See note 14 supra for the text of § 5(a).
46. 439 U.S. at 397-98. Testimony indicated that although physicians for both sides
preferred saline-amnioinfusion (the removal of some amniotic fluid which is replaced
within the amniotic sac by a saline solution) for second trimester abortions because that
method nearly always results in fetal death, they also assumed that use of saline-am-
nioinfusion would be prohibited by § 5(a) for post-viability abortions. Opinions on methods
that satisfied § 5(a) varied widely. Preferences ranged from no abortion, to prostaglandin
infusion (the injection of prostaglandins into the uterus to stimulate uterine contractions
and induce labor, resulting in expulsion of the fetus via the cervix in approximately 30
hours), to hysterotomy (a caesarian section-type operation), to oxytosin induction (in-
travenous injection resulting in a shorter injection-abortion interval than the 17 to 35
hours in saline-amnioinfusions). All methods produce some side effects in women. See
Brief for Appellants at 10-12, 20-25 and Brief for Appellees at 6-8 for a more detailed
discussion of the preferred abortion methods.
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fetus, or whether it forced the physician to jeopardize the woman's
health for an increased chance of fetal survival. Moreover, since
criminal liability could be imposed for the choice of abortive technique
regardless of the lack of scienter, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
"standard of care" provision was also unconstitutionally vague."
The dissenters,'8 speaking through Justice White, viewed the majori-
ty's decision as withdrawing from the states the substantial power to
protect fetal life reserved to them by Roe v. Wade" and reaffirmed in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.' Justice White compared the "may
be viable" language in the Pennsylvania law to the definition of viability
in Roe v. Wade, where the Court approved the prohibition of abortions
when a fetus was "potentially able to live outside the mother's
womb."5 ' He stated that the Pennsylvania law did not go as far as was
permissible in forbidding abortions since, under the Roe standard, a
state can proscribe abortions when the fetus is "potentially able" to
survive outside the mother's womb. Instead, Pennsylvania proscribed
abortions only when the fetus was actually capable of survival, and
merely regulated abortions when the fetus "may be viable.1
52
Justice White observed that the district court held that section 5(a)
was invalid because that section carved out a period of potential
viability during which the state could not regulate abortions in the in-
terest of protecting fetal life. He contended that the Supreme Court
had rejected the same argument in Danforth. There, a statute which
defined viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of
the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb," was
upheld as consistent with the definition in Roe that a fetus is viable if
"potentially able to live outside the mother's womb."" Thus, Justice
White viewed the majority's affirmance of the district court's misinter-
pretation of Danforth as an abandonment of the flexible definition of
viability developed in Roe and Danforth."
Justice White also criticized the majority's interpretation of section
5(a) that criminal penalties could be imposed upon physicians who
violated that section without proof of scienter.55 He stated that reading
47. 439 U.S. 400-01.
48. Id. at 401-09 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
joined the dissenting opinion.
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See note 15 supra.
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See note 31 supra and text accompanying note 53 infra.
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160, 163.
52. 439 U.S. at 402-03 (White, J., dissenting).
53. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 63.
54. 439 U.S. at 404-06 (White, J., dissenting).
55. I& at 407-09 (White, J., dissenting).
1979
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section 5(a) in conjunction with the Pennsylvania criminal homicide
laws" makes scienter as well as the defenses of ignorance and mistake
of fact applicable to prosecutions under the Abortion Control Act. 7
Finally, the dissenters disagreed that the "standard of care" provi-
sion in section 5(a) was impermissibly vague for lack of a mens rea re-
quirement. Because the complaint did not attack section 5(a) on that
ground, and because the district court neither considered nor in-
validated the section on that basis, Justice White questioned the ap-
pellants' right to have the "standard of care" provision invalidated by
the Supreme Court, thus expanding the relief obtained in the district
court."
Three cases challenging the validity of abortion statutes are of par-
ticular relevance in assessing Colautt The most significant is Roe v.
Wade,"9 in which the Court found that the right of privacy' included
the fundamental right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy."1 That
right was not absolute, but subject to limitation if justified by a "com-
pelling state interest.""2 Roe articulated two permissible state in-
terests. First, a state has a compelling interest in preserving and pro-
tecting the health of a pregnant woman. This interest may be fur-
thered by abortion regulations related to maternal health for the
period following the end of the first trimester of the pregnancy. Sec-
ond, and most important in regard to Colautti, a state has a compelling
interest in the "potentiality of human life." This interest becomes com-
pelling only at viability," since not until then is the fetus capable of
life outside the mother's womb."' The Roe decision adopted a flexible
56. See notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
57. 439 U.S. at 407-09 (White. J., dissenting). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 304 (Purdon
1973) provides that ignorance as to a matter of fact negates the specific intent necessary
for criminal homicide.
58. 439 U.S. at 408-09 (White, J., dissenting).
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See note 15 supra.
60. The United States Constitution does not specifically mention a right of privacy,
but the Court has recognized that such a right exists. The sources of the right are found
in the first amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); in the fourth and fifth
amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
(1967); in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484-85 (1965); in the ninth amendment, id at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring); and in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. A woman's right to privacy is embodied in four-
teenth amendment concepts of liberty. Id. See also note 60 supra.
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
63. Id. at 160. The Court defined "viable" as potentially able to survive outside the
mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. Id.
64. Id.
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viability standard in order to accommodate professional medical judg-
ment and advances in medical skill." According to Roe, once the fetus
is viable, a state may further its interest in protecting fetal life
through the regulation or proscription of abortions except when an
abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother." The
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act may have overstepped the Roe
guidelines, which delineated only two stages in a pregnancy-the pre-
viability period and the post-viability period-by creating a third stage
during which a fetus "may be viable," and then attempting to regulate
abortions during that time for reasons unrelated to maternal health."1
In Roe's companion case, Doe v. Bolton," the Court held that a
physician's best medical judgment provides an adequate standard for
the determination of whether an abortion is necessary to preserve the
life or health of a woman during the post-viability stage of her
pregnancy. 9 The Doe decision emphasized that physicians must be
allowed the discretion to exercise their best clinical judgment in light
of all factors relevant to maternal health."
In the third case, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,7" the Court passed
upon a statutory definition of "viable" which differed from the defini-
tion put forth by the Roe Court. The challenged statute defined viability
as occurring when the life of the fetus "may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb." This definition was held to comply with the stan-
dards in Roe."7 To support this conclusion, the Court conceptualized the
point at which fetal life "may be indefinitely continued" outside the
womb as occurring at a point later in time than when the fetus was
merely "potentially able" to survive outside the womb." Although the
Danforth Court indicated that the state was not limited to defining
viability exactly as did the Roe Court, it spoke of the determination of
viability as being a matter for the physician's judgment,7 ' and preserved
65. Id. Viability usually occurs at about 7 months, but may occur as early as 24
weeks gestation age. lId
66. Id. at 163-64.
67. The mere possibility that the Act created an ambiguous third stage was sufficient
reason for the Colautti Court to invalidate the statute. See text accompanying note 40
supra.
68. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Doe was decided by the Supreme Court the same day as Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See note 15 supra.
69. 410 U.S. at 191.
70. Id. at 192.
71. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also note 21 and accompanying text supra.
72. Id. at 64.
73. Id. at 64-65.
74. Id. at 64. The Court stated that "[tlhe determination of whether a particular fetus
is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physi-
cian." I&
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the flexibility of the term."'
In general, case law has indicated that it is not for legislatures or
courts to place viability at a precise gestation age"8 because it is essen-
tially a medical concept, which is subject to variation from fetus to
fetus, and therefore, must be a matter for professional judgment by a
responsible physician. 7 Although the dissenters claimed that the Court
in Colautti had "disowned" the previous definition of viability in Roe
and Danforth,"8 Justice Blackmun clearly stated that the majority's
decision adhered to and reaffirmed the definition established in Roe
and confirmed in Doe and Danforth."9
With this prior case law as background, Colautti examined the
language of the Pennsylvania statute in light of the standards evolved
by previous cases interpreting vague statutes. Although the language
expressing the rule of the doctrine of void for vagueness' varies from
case to case,8 three basic and universally accepted principles have
75. 1&
76. See Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1355 (1976) (presumption of viability dur-
ing second half of gestation period, or at end of the twentieth week, is unconstitutional);
Leigh v. Olson, 385 F. Supp. 255, 261 (D. Minn. 1974) (statute prohibiting the abortion of a
"quick child" unconstitutional since the period of quickening is from 16 to 18 weeks gesta-
tion age); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (D. Minn. 1974) (statute setting
viability at 20 weeks held to be an unreasonable interference with fundamental right).
77. See note 74 supra. The professional judgment of a qualified physician acting
under stress is generally protected from post hoc review by his peers as well as by lay
juries. In Doe, the Supreme Court struck down a statutory scheme for advance review of
the attending physician's judgment by other physicians. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at
195-200. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976), the
manslaughter conviction of the attending physician was reversed and acquittal ordered
because it amounted to "an attempted post hoc review of the attending physician's
judgments through a battle of experts before a lay jury with a threat of criminal convic-
tion and professional disgrace." Id. at 14.
78. 439 U.S. at 405-06 (White, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 393 n.11.
80. For a thorough analysis of the void for vagueness doctrine, see Note, The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1969). In present
day jurisprudence the void for vagueness principle is treated almost exclusively as a dic-
tate of constitutional due process. Historically, however, the doctrine is traceable to the
common law practice of refusing enforcement of legislative enactments considered too in-
definite to be fairly applied. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 120 n.5, 389 A.2d 341,
344 n.5 (1978).
81. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963)
(void for vagueness means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could
not reasonably understand that contemplated conduct is proscribed); Raley v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 423, 438 (1959) (state may not issue commands to its citizens, under criminal sanc-
tions, in language so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of what conduct
might transgress the commands); Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344, 353 (1959) (fundamental
fairness requires that a person not be sent to jail "for a crime he could not be reasonably
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emerged from a long line of Supreme Court cases. First, a criminal
statute must be couched in terms explicit enough to inform those to
whom it applies of the conduct that is either required or forbidden. A
cardinal requirement of penal statutes, that of fair warning, was lack-
ing in the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, thereby exposing physi-
cians to criminal sanctions based upon unknown standards under sec-
tion 5(a)."2
Second, laws must supply explicit standards to prevent arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement." The Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act was flawed in this regard-its failure to clearly specify criminal
standards enabled enforcement officers and triers of fact to make ad
hoc decisions based upon their individual standards and prejudices."
Third, where a statute appears to intrude upon fundamental con-
stitutional liberties, the vagueness of the statute may curb the exer-
cise of those freedoms by causing citizens to "steer far wider of the
lawful zone" than if precise boundaries are drawn between lawful and
unlawful conduct." The problem with the Pennsylvania Act was its use
of the general disagreement among physicians as to when a second
trimester fetus becomes viable to impose criminal liability upon the
physician faced with making a specific determination of viability. This
prospect might have caused physicians to be excessively cautious in
determining viability, which would have severely affected a woman's
right to have an abortion at a point near viability.
Because Colautti involved the sensitive human right to terminate a
pre-viability pregnancy, the Supreme Court's close scrutiny of section
5(a) was proper. Although the Danforth decision exemplifies the
Court's willingness to examine definitions of viability differing from
the definition approved in Roe," Colautti reaffirms that the Court is
certain to know he was committing").
82. See notes 30 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
83. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974) (state statute prohibiting public
contemptuous treatment of the United States flag held unconstitutional because it permit-
ted selective law enforcement); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)
(anti-noise statute prohibiting willful noise or disturbance near schools in session upheld
against argument of arbitrary application).
84. See notes 44 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
85. See Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.7 (1974) (the chilling effect upon the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights caused by vague statutes mandates that such statutes
specifically describe the prohibited behavior); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368
U.S. 278, 287 (1961) (statute requiring written oath that state employees had never lent
their aid, support, advice or counsel to the Communist party impermissibly vague);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948) (facial challenge is proper if statute is
vague and affects fundamental rights).
86. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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determined to adhere to the central concept of Roe that viability is a
fluid medical and legal concept and shall remain so. Colautti stresses
Danforth's designation of viability as a matter for medical judgment,
skill and technical ability and makes a strong statement for the use of
subjective standards in judging the liability of a physician charged
with having made an incorrect viability determination. 7 Through the
Colautti decision, the Court has issued a warning that it stands firmly
by the limitations already placed upon the police power of the states.
The Colautti decision is a reminder that attempts to circumvent the
guidelines enunciated in Roe by placing restraints upon a physician's
discretion are intolerable and unlikely to succeed.
Deborah Aliwine
87. 439 U.S. at 387-88. The Court held that "[viability is reached when, in the judg-
ment of the attending physician on the facts of the case before him, there is a reasonable
likelihood of the fetus' sustained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial sup-
port." I at 388 (emphasis added).
